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                     Abstract
Economists sometimes interpret the failure of a
significance test to disconfirm a hypothesis as
evidence that this hypothesis is valid. Six
examples of this are cited from recent journals.
But this is a misinterpretation of what
significance tests show. While in general it is
correct that every failure to disconfirm a
hypothesis adds to its credibility, the term
"disconfirm" is defined differently for this
purpose than it is in the context of significance
tests.
This paper makes no claim to establish some hitherto
unknown result. Instead, it shows that in our
everyday thinking and practice we often ignore a
principle that presumably many of us learned in
our basic statistics course. A like reason for this is
that this principle seems to conflict with another
widely accepted principle. But this apparent conflict
is spurious because a critical term is defined
differently in these two principles.
      I. Treating a Failure to Disconfirm as Confirmation
Suppose that in testing the hypothesis that the long
run aggregate supply curve is vertical the regression
coefficient of the lagged inflation term, instead of
being the predicted 1.0, is 0.7 with a standard error
of 0.2. Is it legitimate to say that the data have not
disconfirmed the hypothesis? Is it also legitimate to
go further and claim that the data corroborate the
hypothesis, so that if you previously attributed, say a
50 percent probability to its validity you should now
attribute a greater probability to it? Most economists
would probably answer yes to both questions.2
 The first of these answers is questionable, while the
second is wrong. This is so, because failure to
disconfirm a hypothesis (e.g., the long-run Phillips
curve being vertical) does not imply that this
hypothesis has been confirmed. If it did one could in
some cases generate a paradox by first showing that the
data do not disconfirm a hypothesis, say that a>b, and
then also showing that they do not disconfirm the
opposite hypothesis that a<b. (Cf. Mirowski, 2001, p.
195)
 Perhaps economists have lost sight of this principle
for two reasons. One is the familiar (Popperian)
principle that the only way the empirical validity of a
hypothesis can tentatively be established is by the
repeated failure of relevant tests to disconfirm it
1.
But, as discussed below, this principle does not apply
here because it defines "failure to disconfirm" very
differently from the way it is defined in the context
of significance tests.
 The second reason is a misinterpretation of what
significance tests do. They are not intended to answer
the question whether a hypothesis is correct or
incorrect. Instead, their function is to help decide
whether we should admit this hypothesis into the corpus
of verified knowledge. For that we rightly set a high
hurdle; we will admit it only if it is consistent with
the data, and if this consistency is highly unlikely -
usually interpreted to mean a less than 5 percent
probability - to be due merely to sampling error. The 5
percent hurdle is a severe one, intentionally set to
reject the hypothesis in doubtful cases, and thus to
generate more Type II than Type I errors. This bias
against new hypotheses presumably reflects an
asymmetric loss function; with so many hypotheses
clamoring for admittance, a Type II error causes less
damage than does a Type I error.
2
 But in the above example to say that the hypothesis of
a vertical Phillips curve is corroborated because there3
is a greater than 5 percent probability that it is not
wrong, is implicitly to reverse this decision about
Type I and Type II errors. Such an upside down use of
significance tests is not just a peculiarity of the
particular example with which I started the paper. It
occurs whenever we say or imply that a hypothesis has
been confirmed because it has not been rejected at the
5 percent level. And as shown below, this is done with
some frequency.
3
 Put another way, significance tests themselves do not
test hypotheses, but only show what the probability is
that, given a certain hypothesis, such as the null
hypothesis, random sampling errors account for the
difference between the predicted and the actual values
of a coefficient (see Chow, 1996, p. 188. Together with
a conventional (and essentially arbitrary) cut-off
point, such as a 5 percent probability level, they
allow us in some cases to reject the hypothesis.
4 But if
they do not allow us to reject the hypothesis then they
also do not tell us that it is true. But how about the
general principle, that if a test fails to disconfirm a
hypothesis it enhances its credibility at least to some
extent? This is correct if these tests are hard and not
soft tests, so that the statement "fails to disconfirm"
is interpreted correctly. Suppose, for example, that
the t value of the difference between the predicted and
the estimated coefficients is, say 1.5. This is
conventionally interpreted as a failure to reject, and
hence presented as a confirmation of the hypothesis.
Often this is done implicitly: the author merely states
that "the data do not reject" the hypothesis, and
leaves it to the reader to carry away the impression
that it has been confirmed. But with a t value of 1.5
the probability that (on a one-tailed test) a sampling
error accounts for a difference between the predicted
and observed value of the coefficient as great as 1.5
standard errors is only 7 percent, so that the results
of this test should be counted as weak evidence against
the hypothesis instead of a confirmation.4
                                II. Implications
Ignoring the limitation on what can be inferred from a
failure to disconfirm at the 5 percent level has some
undesirable consequences. First, and most obviously,
many hypotheses are accepted that should not be. 
Second, the results of multiple tests can easily be
misinterpreted. Suppose that on the first test a
coefficient which the maintained hypothesis implies is
zero has a t value of 1.5. Suppose that a second test
using another data set produces the same result. The
way significance tests are widely interpreted the
second test is read as enhancing the plausibility of
the hypothesis since two tests have now failed to
reject it. But the correct message of the second test
is that the hypothesis has now been rejected at the 5
percent level, since the probability of a sampling
error as great as 1.5 standard errors on both of these
tests is only 0.5 percent. Third, if one treats the
failure to reject at the 5 percent level as a
confirmation, it is tempting to treat a failure to
reject at the 1 percent level as even stronger
confirmation. But that is wrong when significance tests
are used in the upside-down way discussed here.  It
amounts to rejecting a hypothesis only if, due to
sampling error, there is a 99 percent probability that
it is wrong, rather than rejecting it if there is as
much as a 5 percent probability that it is wrong.
 Another situation in which the misinterpretation of
significance tests can lead to serious error is when
one of the coefficients of a regression has the wrong
sign, but is insignificant at the 5 percent level. It
is then tempting to dismiss the wrong sign as due
merely to sampling error, and to continue to use this
regression as a building block for the maintained
hypothesis. But suppose the coefficient is significant
at, say the 12 percent level. Since it is then unlikely
that a sampling error would result in such a large
coefficient with the wrong sign, the wrong sign -- even
though insignificant at the 5 percent level -- is a5
warning that should not be brushed aside.
 None of this denies that significance tests are useful
when they are applied the right way round,that is when
they are interpreted so that the maintained hypothesis
is treated as not confirmed unless the probability that
sampling error accounts for the observation (e.g., a
regression coefficient exceeding zero) is less than 5
percent. Even then, however, they are subject to many
criticisms that have been leveled mainly by
psychologists and sociologists.
5 Also, as McCloskey and
Ziliak (1996)emphasize, one needs to pay attention to
the economic and not just the statistical significance
of a coefficient.
 The error that results from the tendency to accept
hypotheses because they cannot be rejected at the 5
percent level also arises in connection with
adjustments for heteroscedasticity. The standard
procedure is to make  such adjustments only if the
assumption that the data are normally distributed can
he rejected at the 5 percent level. But what justifies
acting on the assumption that the errors are normally
distributed unless it can be shown that there is a less
than 5 percent probability that they are not?
6 If the
estimation error that results from failure to adjust
for heteroscedasticity when the data are
heteroscedastic is equal to the estimation error that
results if one makes such an adjustment when the data
are normally distributed, then a 50 percent probability
level seems preferable to a 5 percent level. Whether,
in fact, these two estimation errors are equal, or if
not, which is greater, presumably depends on the
specific adjustment for heterogeneity that is made.
 Such a problem also problem exists with respect to
tests for nonstationarity and cointegration. Similarly,
if a Granger causality test shows that one-way
causality cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level,
that does not justify acting as though two-way6
causality can be ruled out.
                                     III. Examples
The following examples show that although the
proposition that failure to disconfirm at the 5 percent
level does not imply confirmation at the 5 percent
level may be well known in principle, practice is
something else. A survey of papers in the American
Economic Review and the Review of Economics and
Statistics in 1999 and 2000 turned up six papers in
which the failure of a coefficient to be significant at
the 5 percent level is incorrectly interpreted as
implying that its true value is zero.
7 This excludes
papers that in a formal sense use significance tests
incorrectly, but in which the t value of the relevant
coefficient is low, so that there is some justification
for arguing that the coefficient can perhaps be treated
as though its true value is zero.
 In one example Robertson (1999, p. 760) reports:
"Dramatic movements in the peso could bias the effects
... To evaluate this possibility, I regressed changes
in the peso on changes in the U.S. ... wage series ... 
. I found no significant correlation. This ... suggests
that this ... bias in not important." But at most it
would suggest this only if the t value of the
coefficient is so low that the coefficient's nonzero
value could easily be accounted for by sampling error.
And Robertson does not tell us whether this is the
case.
 Viscusi and Hamilton (1999) try to determine the
variables (and their relative importance) that
underlie the EPA's decisions about which Superfund
sites to clear up. Among their variables Viscusi
and Hamilton include the size of the currently existing
population, as well as the potential future population,
in the affected area. They find that the currently
affected population has insignificant coefficients in
all four variants of their regression, and therefore7
conclude that:
      These results suggest that the presence of        
      current exposed populations to health 
      risks generally does not enter EPA's decision     
      with respect to the stringency of the cleanup.    
      ... Rather than setting more stringent            
      standards with a higher cost per case of          
      cancer for current exposed populations, EPA       
      incurs as high a cost per case of cancer when     
      there are only potential future populations at    
      risk. ... The presence of a risk to people        
      based on current land-use patterns rather than
      hypothetical future uses did not increase the     
      stringency of the regulation. (Viscusi and        
      Hamilton, 1999, pp. 1017, 1021, 1025.)
 But in two of their four regressions the t values of
the relevant coefficients are 1.3 and 1.5, which are
significant at the 10 percent and 7 percent levels
respectively. They should therefore have warned the
reader that their conclusion that the EPA fails to take
the existing population at risk into account is
disconfirmed at the 10 percent level in one of their
four regression models, and is at the margin in one
other.
 Loeb and Page's (2000, p. 394) study of teachers'
salaries summarizes previous work on their topic as
follows: "Only nine of the sixty teacher salary studies
cited  ... [in a survey paper] produced wage
coefficient estimates that were both positive and
statistically significant. One interpretation of the
literature is that teacher wages are unrelated to
student outcomes." But if in most of the other 51
studies the coefficient has the right sign and is
significant at, say the 40 percent level, that would be
plausible evidence that teachers' wages do affect
student outcomes. Moreover, on the admittedly strong
assumption that the 60 studies are independent and
their results normally distributed, 9 of them, that is
15 percent, being significant with the correct sign is8
more than one would expect if the true value of the
wage coefficient were zero.
 In estimating the effect of corruption on foreign
direct investment (FDI) from different countries
Shang-Jin Wei (2000) includes in some regressions a
dummy variable for FDI from Japan, the U.K. and the
U.S. Since its coefficient "is not significant at the
10% level," he concludes that FDIs from these countries
are "just as sensitive  ... as FDIs from other source
countries." (p. 6.) But the t values of these dummy are
very close to unity (1.04, 0.96, 1.06, 1.02 in
different regressions), which implies on a one-tailed
test (given a normal distribution) that there is only
about a one third chance that the true value of the
coefficient is zero.
 Papell et al. (2000, p. 313) in discussing the
stability of the natural rate of unemployment tell us
that: "ten of the eleven countries have at most two
significant breaks, providing almost equally strong
evidence [as their evidence previously given against
the hypothesis of no break] that there have been only a
few permanent changes in postwar unemployment." But the
fact that for additional breaks there is no evidence
that is significant at the 5 percent level is not
"strong evidence" against such breaks. Failure to be
significant at the 5 percent level could, for example,
be due to the size of the sample.
 McConnell and Perez-Quiros (2000, p. 1467) in their
analysis of the decline in the variability of the
growth rates of U.S. GDP in the 1980s report that: "in
all cases we cannot reject the null of no break and
therefore conclude that the variance break is not
attributable to a change in the constant and the AR
component of the model." But for two of their four test
statistics the p value of the coefficients are 0.67 and
0.62, suggesting that the absence of a variance break
in the AR components is by  no means well established.9
                          IV. Alternative Procedures
If a hypothesis has not been rejected at the 5 percent
level it is often desirable to look at the probability
that this is due, not to the validity of the
hypothesis, but to the sample being too small, (given
the variance of the data) to provide anything but an
ambiguous answer. In some cases it may be possible to
obtain an unambiguous answer by testing and rejecting
the null hypothesis. But that requires the often
unattainable condition that the null can be stated
precisely (see Fisher, 1935, pp. 18-20).
 A different, and much more widely applicable solution
is to abandon the Neyman-Pearson variant of
significance testing, at least in those cases in which
the maintained hypothesis is not disconfirmed, in favor
of the Fisherian variant. Researchers can then report
their p values or confidence intervals, so that they -
and their readers - can decide from this information,
in combination with prior information, how credible the
hypothesis is.
8 Despite its subjectivity this is
preferable to claiming erroneously that the failure of
a significance test to disconfirm a hypothesis at
the 5 percent level implies that this hypothesis has
been confirmed. And it is also better than the
researcher deciding behind the scenes whether the p
value warrants advocating the hypothesis.
 A possible solution to the problem of whether to
adjust for heteroscedasticity and non-stationarity
when significance tests do not reject homoscedasticity
and stationarity at the 5 percent level is to do at
least the more important regressions both with and
without adjustments. If they differ substantively, then
both sets of results should be reported.
                                 V. Summary
Perhaps because of a tendency to use significance tests
mechanically, it is easy to confuse the proposition
that such a test does not reject a hypothesis at the 510
percent level with the proposition that it has
confirmed it at the 5 percent level, As several
examples demonstrate, this error has occurred in
various papers. Hence, when their significance tests do
not reject their hypothesis at the 5 percent level
researchers should state the p values of their
maintained hypotheses.
 
                       ENDNOTES
* University of California, Davis. E-mail:
tommayer@bayarea.net I am indebted to David Jacks for
able research assistance.
1.  It could also be due to a natural tendency to do
some things that are necessary to obtain a clear
result, even if it means cutting corners (see Leamer,
1978, p. iv).
2. Thus, a biologist, Davis Wolfe (2001, p. 27) writes:
" Peer review of grant proposals and publications,
along with many other subtler barriers, has been
established to prevent one renegade scientist from
leading us all over the cliff and into the dreaded
Abyss of False Theories," Whether one should act on the
presumption that the hypothesis is false depends, of
course, also on the loss function.
3. That failure to reject does not imply acceptance has
been known for a long time, though economists seem to
show less awareness of it than do psychologists and
sociologists, who tend to frame the discussion in terms
of the acceptance of the null hypothesis. (For
discussions by psychologists and sociologists see
Rozenblum, 1960, Morrison and  Henkel, 1970. and "Open
Peer Comment" (1998). Chow. a psychologist, (1896, p.
ix) remarks that: "although the null hypothesis
significance-test procedure ... is an integral
component of data analysis in empirical research, many
researchers have reservations about its validity or
utility." Frick (1995, p. 132) reports that: "The11
best-know attitude toward the null hypothesis is that
it should never be accepted. A survey of 15
undergraduate research methodology textbooks revealed
that 4 did not mention the possibility of accepting the
null hypothesis, and 7 claimed that it should never be
accepted ..."  In the half dozen undergraduate economic
and business statistics texts that I looked at none
warned about accepting the null. However, a text by two
statisticians (Snedecor and Cochran, 1980, p. 66,
italics in the original) points out that:
      it is not clear just what should be concluded      
      from a nonsignificant result. A test of            
      significance is most easily taught as a rule       
      for deciding whether to accept or reject the       
      null hypothesis. But the meaning of the word       
      accept requires careful thought. A                 
      nonsignificant result does not prove that the      
      null hypothesis is correct - merely that it        
      is tenable.
4. The problem of theory choice is extremely complex,
and significance tests play only a modest role in it. It
may sometimes be reasonable to reject a hypothesis that
is confirmed at the 5 percent level in favor of one that
is not.
5. Thus Chow (1996 p. 11), who himself defends the use
of significance tests, writes "the overall assessment of
the ...  [null-hypotheses significance test procedure]
in psychology is not encouraging. The puzzle is why so
many social scientists persist in using the process."
Chow argues persuasively that these criticisms of
significance tests are largely due to researchers trying
to read too much into them.
6. The argument that most variables are distributed
normally is open to the objection that while many are
normally distributed in natural numbers, many others are
log-normally distributed (see Aitchison and Brown,
1957).12
7. I also looked - without success - for such papers in
the  Journal of Political Economy, February 2000 to
February 2001, and at one paper in the 2001 Quarterly
Journal of Economics. I did not read all papers in the
journals that I covered, so I may have missed some
misuses of significance tests. I did not include cases
where a significance test was used to decide whether to
adjust for non-stationarity or for heteroscedasticity.
That is not always reported and, in any case, it is such
a common practice that it does not need documentation.
8. See Rozenblum (1970) As Rosnow and Rosenthal (1989,
p. 1277) remark: "God loves the 0.6 nearly as much as
the 0.5." However, as Chow (1996, p. 39) points out, in
interpreting the p value one needs to keep in mind that
it measures the probability of sampling error contingent
on the hypothesis being true.
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